assistance offerings. so there has been some efforts. there probably could be many more initiatives of that type. but i think the field has understood that that's an important constituency. >> i would just agree that there's a huge opportunity for more. i think one issue that we face is a lack of awareness of the programs. aeo along with citi gave an award at our last conference -- this year, 2013, of hearing impaired organization -- a business that's a hearing-impaired organization training entrepreneurs. so i think trying to get more recognitioning and opportunity -- recognition and opportunity to increase replications is huge and one of the things that we're trying to do is help to poet that particular -- promote that particular model but raise the visibility of programs overall.

>> so thank you. so we are at 1:30, so i'm going to draw us to a close. i want to thank my panelists here today. thank all of you for being here and for your contributions today and for, most importantly, for the work that provides the basis for you to comment today. i want to thank don graves for being with us and setting the stage so nicely. thank the annie e. casey foundation for their support for this event. i want to note a couple things. one is that the papers -- and not just the microenterprise ones, but there is a web site, big ideas for jobs.org, and you can find all of the papers there. we are the second event here at aspen focusing on a couple other papers for the series. they're not focused specifically on the opportunities and policies that could support the work that social enterprises do, that anchor institutions like hospitals and educational institutions and others can do to create jobs, again, specifically focused on individuals and communities that have the largest challenges this

attaching to our economy. so we don't have a date for that yet, but we're going to set it. we're working on it. and so we'll send invitations out to all of you again since you've been with us today, so look for that in the next couple of weeks. thank you again for joining us today. have a happy thanksgiving, and shop small business on saturday. [laughter] [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> today the leader of french opposition party talks about france and the rest of the international community.

he'll discuss a range of issues including the eurozone crisis and his country's refusal to sign off on the recent iranian nuclear deal. we'll have live remarks beginning at 6:30 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> i didn't get the idea for the for dummies series. i had an idea to do a beginning book about computers, about dos b specifically, and i kind of inspired myself to do that just dealing with people in magazine editing job i had and being on the radio at that time and being out in the public and talking to people about computers. it was obvious that people wanted to learn more, but the material we had available at the time just wasn't doing the job. we had beginner books on how to use computers, but they sucked. they just didn't have that, you know, they were con desending, they were patron nicing, the author was arrogant. he was like, well, you'll never get this stuff anyway, or like,

hey, look at this, this is cool. people didn't want to know that. i they wanted to use a computer. idg originally planned to publish one book, and even then there was some reluctancy with the title when the owner found out that they had this book, dos for dummies in the press, he's like you can't offend the reader, cancel that book. and unfortunately -- well, fortunately, 5,000 copies came off the press. originally, it was going to be 7500. but they stopped it at 5,000. and they figured, okay, we'll shove this out in the marketplace, and it'll go away. at the time not all the bookstores wanted to have it. walden books said, no, we don't want to insult our reader, we don't want that. but even with just 5,000 copies out there -- and this is before the internet, this is before, you know, when we had bookstores, real bookstores that people went into -- they came in, and it was gone. in a week it was sold out because people wanted it.

it was like they just saw it, and they were like that's for me. i'm a dummy, i want that book. >> today there are more than 250 million books in print and more than 1800 for dummies titles out there. find out more this weekend as booktv and american history tv look at the history and literary life of cure delewin, door delean, idaho. next, speakers tom lawson, second in command of the canadian military. he talks about the future of nato, securing the u.s./canadian border and the u.s. role in the asia-pacific region. the center for strategic and international studies hosted this one hour forum. >> i know it's a wet day and a holiday week, so i really appreciate everyone joining us today. we want to talk today about the state of the u.s./canada bilateral defense relations. and let me in particular welcome

you to csis' new home here at 1616 rhode island avenue. i'm kathleen hicks, henry a. kissinger chair and director of the international security program here at csis, and i'm very pleased to have the honor of introducing today's guest speaker, and this is the chief of defense staff of canada, general lawson. he's had a long and distinguished career serving in his current position since october 2012. prior to his most recent promotion, he served as deputy commander at norad which is at peterson air force base this colorado, so he is no stranger to the importance of u.s./canadian defense cooperation. he has also held such distinguished positions as assistant chief of the air staff and commandant of the royal military college in kingston. he led the stand up of the strategic joint staff and has served as command oring officer -- commanding officer of 412 squadron based in ottawa.

general lawson graduated from the military college of canada with a bachelor of science degree as well as a master of science in the electrical can engineering and while attending the u.s. armed forces command staff college in montgomery, alabama, he completed a masters of public administration in at auburn. so he's thoroughly educated, i think it's fair to say. drawing on that record of service and expertise, general lawson has agreed to share his thoughts on the u.s./canadian defense relationship. secretary hagel just last week called this relationship one of the strongest in the world and, indeed, our canadian friends have fought alongside american troops in the volatile kandahar province in afghanistan at the height of the conflict, and they continue to deploy some 950 troops this a training capacity near kabul. just this past friday, they signed the canada/u.s. asia-pacific cooperation framework to increase our security cooperation in this

important region. this will be done in the framework of the canada/u.s. joint board of defense. this is the context in which general lawson will address the state of u.s./canada bilateral defense regulations, and we all look forward to hearing what he thats to say on the subject. i want to ask everyone to please write down on the index cards we've provided to you any questions that his remarks or this opportunity for dialogue evoke. and if you do not have a card, please, raise your hand, and we'll distribute them to you now. after general lawson completes his prepared remarks, i'll ask the staff to collect your index cards, and we have two of our senior fellows here who will combine the questions in group-like groupings and facilitate a follow-on discussion. so with that, i want to thank again general lawson and please join me this welcoming him today. [applause]

>> thank you very much for that warm welcome, kathleen. and just absolutely delighted to be here. feeling very affectionate towards washington regard he is of that atrocious weather. the washington capitals just came up into canada and got beaten by both the montreal decade yens and my beloved toronto maple leafs. so what a wonderful city. it is also with all the extensive traveling my family and i have done across the united states amongst your great states and cities, this is our very favorite here, and all of you who are based here will know exactly why that is. ladies and gentlemen, i thank csis for inviting me here this afternoon. i thank you for being here. and i really am pleased to be here at an institution that's so well known for its forward thinking. and before i go any further, let me thank the organizers. your hard work behind the scenes is very much appreciated. over the course of my career,

i've had many opportunities, as kathleen was saying, to work with the great men and women of the u.s. armed services ranging from my time at staff college as a puppy and then all the way to just a year and a half ago when i was happily in colorado springs doing my norad duties when i got called out for another posting. but during this past year as canada's newest chief of defense staff; i've been able to view our relationship, the canadian-american relationship, from a slightly different perspective. and i must say i have a renewed appreciation for just how close and just how important and just how far reaching our bilateral relationship is. there's a real spirit of partnership and collaboration that permeates our defense relationship and our governments and militaries are connected through a network of arrangements and joint institutions that really do form a fabric that's very impressive. i think it's largely because long ago our two countries

learned how to leverage each other's strengths and how our mutual prosperity and security depends upon our military being truly connected and interoperable not just at home, but also abroad. and the canadian armed forces for its size is one of those few capabilities that allow us to be engaged anywhere in the world, agile, deployable and responsive. and being a reliable partner in continental defense is certainly one of our most important priorities. at the same time, we in canada are also committed to doing our fair share on the international front. and it's my sincere hope that when you leave here today, you'll have a better appreciation for what the canadian armed forces do on the world stage and here in north america as well. let's speak a little bit about the foundation of the canada-u.s. relationship as we see it. canada and the be u.s. have a long history of cooperation on defense and security issues. the strong ties between our

militaries were developed in part by fighting side by side in no most of the major conflicts over the past hundred years. we have fought, we have fought together in both of the world wars, we were both founding members of nato in 1949, we fought together as battle buddies in korea 60 years ago, and that battle buddy theme has been found over the last decade throughout the mission if afghanistan. in afghanistan. as a result, we've developed close personal bonds, we have learned from each other, and we've seen the importance of making sure our forces are truly interoperable. even allowing the soldiers of our own nation to be led by general officers from the other armed forces, and that's a bond of trust you'll only find between the very closest of nations. the ultimate foundation of our interoperability is anchored in nato where we've been working together with our transatlantic partners were over 60 years now.

but be nato's about much more than interoperability, it is a political alliance of like-minded democracies united by common values and principles. it has demonstrated the political will to act, and it has the capability to do so. it can be a true force for good, and we need to insure that we, the u.s. and canada, uphold that transatlantic commitment with our european friends and allies. between our two nations, our long and close partnership has allowed and at the same time required the establishment of joint institutions to help us continue to strengthen our defense cooperation. canada and the u.s. have a forum to discuss defense policies in the form of the permanent joint board on defense be, affection that itly known as the pjbd, and it was founded by u.s. president roosevelt and canadian prime minister mckenzie king in 1940, and this board through those years since that time has

examined virtually every important combined defense measure undertaken between our two countries since the second world war until now including the construction of distant early warning line of radars, the creation of the north american aerospace defense command, norad, as well as the response to the attacks of 9/11. the next gathering of the pjbd is going to be held in ottawa this december, it will be the 22nd meeting -- 2 32nd meeting of this group this its 73 years of existence. but our most impressive cooperation is without a doubt manager very warm in my heart, north american aerospace defense command, norad, created in 1958. now, many nations have bilateral relationships as, for instance, canada and the united states have with our other allies, but the norad agreement is truly a unique construct in that it is a binational agreement. norad actually brings the

monitoring and defense of north american air space under the same roof, and for purposes of continental air defense actually does away with the border. imagine that. when you read about norad history, you'll see that our government officials in the late 1950s took great pains to work out ask determine just what -- and determine just what this could mean, this erasing of the border in the worst case, this potential loss of sovereignty. and the remarkable thing is that in the 55 years since the stand-up of norad, none of these concerns have come to amount to anything. in fact, in 2006 in the universal recognition that this agreement has been mutually beneficial, our countries agreed to add may tame warning fictions to norad allowing us to share sensitive information on activities conducted off the north american coastlines. and i can tell you that the work being dope by canadians and -- done by canadians and americans side by side is a very real symbol of our friendship, our

commitment to cooperation and our mutual trust. and as our defense relationship bros, these institutions grow as well to meet our new needs. with the norad strategic review, for example, canada and the u.s. are looking at emerging defense and security challenges and how our countries can rare to meet them. -- can prepare to meet them. safeguarding north america is not a simple task. together we cover a lot of land. that's why canadians are proud to be a meaningful contributor to defense, and a good example of that is radar two providing armed forces with all day and night surveillance in other areas where equipment is challenged, simply unable to operate if harsh and unpredictable arctic region, for example. and its 2018 replacement will enhance our current surveillance capabilities by allowing realtime tracking of ships

approaching our mutual shorelines. canada is the only partner other than the u.s. who is able to contribute to satellite surveillance in such an important way. and this is a capability that's going to be key to north american security and to our joint missions abroad. that's what leveraging each other's strength is all about. let's talk a little bit about canada and u.s. international cooperation in the americas. our interoperability and task sharing make us collectively stronger to defend our continent, and this translate toss a strong partnership on the international front. in the americas, for example, the canadian arms forces have contributed to the u.s. efforts to address illicit trafficking in the hemisphere since 2006 through operation -- [inaudible] recently canada enhanced its contribution to this operation by increasing the number of deployments in flights conducting counterdrug detection and monitoring the caribbean

region, the full of mexico -- the gulf of mexico as well as the central eastern and western pacific ocean. canadian armed forces are proud to participate many this international effort that intercepts and seizes millions of dollars of illicit drugs every year. countering the spread of drug trafficking and organize toed crime in south and central america is key in keeping our hemisphere safe and in promoting secure waterways, an essential part of the canadian and u.s. economies and the economies of our partners in the south. by sharing our military resources, canada and the u.s. are more efficient in the fight against transnational criminal organization. canada's support is only one example of canada's work in the americas where we're always ready to assist this the case of a natural disaster, as we did in haiti three years ago. and canada's also involved actively in fostering cooperation with mexico. indeed, we hosted the first

trilateral meeting of the north american defense ministers in march of last year. this meeting led to the establishment of a framework to develop cooperation between canada, the u.s. and mexico on issues of mutual concern including efforts to address transnational criminal organizations and to respond to disasters in the hemisphere. we're really looking forward to the second trilateral defense ministers meeting which will be hosted by mexico next year. be let's look at some of this international cooperation as it applies to europe, africa and the middle east. ladies and gentlemen, one of the best examples of canada-u.s. operation internationally is nato, a central alliance for both of our nations and a place where we work closely with our european allies to advance our shared global security interests. thanks to nato, canada, the u.s. and many of our allies had a racket call infrastructure to answer -- practical infrastructure to answer the requests of the arab league and the united nations to take

actions over libya two years ago. and the nato structure allowed partners outside of the alliance -- particularly our arab league partners in this case -- to join us in this important mission. canadian armed forces were proud to assume operational command of the mission in libya, in addition to providing air and maritime support. the canadian contribution to the u.s. security coordinator for israel and the palestine authority or ussc is another great example of canadian and american efforts that are giving real results. having visited its mission myself, i can tell you that we together -- canadians and americans -- are making a difference in the lives of both the pal is stint yangs and the israelis and, indeed, contributing to the middle east peace process. in that mission canada and the u.s. are working closely together, leveraging each other's personnel and expertise to achieve success. to me, this is what our defense relationship is really about. we come together, and we get

things done together. these are high profile examples, but our countries also cooperate in some areas that don't off get much attention. just last month, for example, the canadian armed forces responded to a request from the united nations to deploy a royal canadian air force c-17 heavy lift aircraft to transport ten armored civilian vehicles between the u.s. and lebanon to assist in the efforts to eliminate the chemical weapons in syria this line with the mandate of the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons. and nearby in the arabian sea, canada along with the u.s. and 28 other nations contributes regularly towards maritime security and counterterrorism. just a few weeks ago our ship this that region, her majesty's canadian ship toronto, intercepted and boarded a suspicious vessel and discovered 154 bags of heroin. that's 154 bags of heroin that will never reach the streets of our two great nations, a small victory in the hard fight

against drug smuggling. let's look to afghanistan and asia-pacific for more cooperation. ladies and gentlemen, some of you might remember what the former u.s. ambassador to canada, david jacob soften, said in the aftermath of 9/11. he said our shared sense of security and the belief that the oceans on either side of us and the warm relations between us kept us distant and protected from the world's outside dangers came crashing down on that day. and that feeling was heartily felt across canada. i remember a few days after the horrible events in new york and is here in washington how over 100,000 people gathered together on parliament hill in ottawa for a national day of mourning. those canadians came together not just to honor the thousands of victims who lost their lyes, but also to -- lives, but also to clearly display their solidarity with their friends and neighbors in the wake of such sorrow and loss. and this was only the beginning

of canada's support to the u.s. in the wake of 9/11. once the initial crisis of september 11th had been dealt with to the best of our shared abilities, we turned our attention to the terrorist network that had inspired and orchestrated the attacks and to the regime that gave that terrorist network sanctuary. as the international community quickly rallied behind the united states in condemning both al-qaeda and afghanistan's taliban government, canada took a leading role in responding and had boots on ground as early as december of 2001. and from 2006 to 2010, our efforts in afghanistan brought us to the volatile canned around province. -- kandahar province. beginning in 2008, the u.s. backed us up with reinforcements, and these were u.s. soldiers placed under canadian command. as i've said, a powerful demonstration of the degree of interoperability and trust that exists between our armed forces. and from that demanding combat environment this kandahar, we

transitioned two years ago to operation attention to train -- to the training mission devoted to supporting nato's main strategic objective, that of preparing the afghan national security forces to take responsibility for afghanistan's security by themselves. since 2011 canada has been the second largest contributor to the nato training mission after the united states. and and as kathleen said, roughly 950 of our troops focused on giving the afghans the tools they need not only to fight the taliban and affiliates, but also to train their own forces in this effect. indeed, afghan forces are now not only planning and leading most security operations across the nation, but 90% of all military training in afghanistan is now being conducted by the afghans themselves. that's a strategic and operational success, one that will pay dividends over the long term by helping insure that afghan forces can sustain their progress and ultimately help

prevent afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. terrorists that would pose a threat to us, our citizens and our allies. another area of the world that has a large impact upon us is the asia-pacific region. qanta has long -- canada has long reck thesed the importance of asia with. its continued peaceful rise depends fundamentally upon be its security and stability. canada and the u.s. share with our asian partners a vested interest in maintaining this stability x. this drives our effort to maintain and build on our history of joint cooperation. thus, we have head a commitment to pursue -- made a commitment to pursue opportunities not only for increased cooperation, but also a coordinated and targeted efforts to build capabilities and to bolster confidence among friends and neighbors. as you might be aware just a few days ago, our nations signed the

canada-u.s.-asia-pacific policy framework in order to enhance bilateral cooperation and collaboration this that region. this new framework provides the basis upon which our two countries agree to coordinate defense-related act thetivities with our asian partners in areas of mutual interest while maintaining each other's ability and flexibility to take independent actions or positions. it's the latest example of how canada and the united states are working together to make our joint efforts complimentary and judicious while avoiding dupely case. duplication. ladies and gentlemen, as you go forward in your work sharing your thoughts and ideas, i hope you'll remember that you need only look -- you need only to look north of the border to find a reliable, committed ally and friend, one that's making a meaningful contribution to our common security whether here at home, in north america, as key transatlantic partners in nato or elsewhere on the world's stage. the link between our countries

and the friendship between our militaries is truly unique, and it's also precious. by working side by side, we accomplish more than by working alone, and going forward, we will continue to find more opportunities for cooperation so that together we can make a difference. ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for the invitation, i'd be happy to entertain your questions. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> so if you have your cards, we'll have folks coming around to collect those now. if you can just raise them up, we'll continue with our conversation and collect those for the follow of on q&a.

>> great. thank you very much, general lawson, that was a wonderful speech and a great overview. and reminder of how much canada, first of all, isen gauged in the world -- is engaged in the world, canadian forces, and certainly how close we are in our own goals and objectives, the united states and canada with regard to engaging the world. i wonder if we could talk first maybe about the end of come watt operations in afghanistan -- combat operations this afghanistan. you spoke about afghanistan, you spoke about all the other priorities that there are in the world, but also how afghanistan and libya provided real world opportunities for the united states and canada to work very

closely together, to be interoperable. following operations in afghanistan, what are your thoughts about the best ways we can continue to insure without that living laboratory, the if you will, how we can continue to insure our forces remain interoperable? >> well, that's a great question. it's a challenge that faces chairman dempsey and i as we go forward. you know, we leave afghanistan probably as interoperable as an air force and army especially as we ever have been. and right back to my earliest days in nato in germany flying with the americans and watching our troops work working with the americans still, it doesn't come close to where we are as we depart afghanistan now. so the challenge is to capture that doctrine and here back on the continent exercise. it's easy for us from the time winter sets in in canada, canadian troops are looking to

come down across the border into your great training areas, and americans can also be enticed north anytime after april as well. but i think bigger than that we have been engaged tactically, i think that that will come easily. but we've been engaged at the very highest levels operationally and strategically as well, and that will come through some larger exercises. the americans' impact off the west coast and canada seeks to be a very and expects to be a large part in the senior leadership there and also in our large exercise, joint exercise that's held every two years. we seek and i'm sure we'll find be a willing group of american leaders who will help us to come up with that. so it's an entire range of skills that we've become very good at that we'll want to continue to hone in coming years. >> you also mentioned, aas i think i did, the asia-pacific

cooperation framework. ask you've just mentioned other cers opportunities. what do you think this new framework provides from a perspective of u.s. and canadian forces but also maybe more on the political geostrategic level, what does it mean and how does canada think about asia as a priority area in its defense strategy? >> yeah. the cooperation framework itself is not unique. we've got a couple of them already between canada and the u.s., ones that speak to central america and another, the caribbean. and they've been useful to us because what they do is they lay out a framework by which we can overlap efforts in operations where that's required or best divide our capabilities so that if one area or one issue is being well looked after with or without the support of the other nation, that can free up certain

capabilities for the other nation to focus on a different area. so i think certainly from an operational point of view it will be very helpful. for example, right now canadians and americans are both employed in the philippines helping the desperate survivors of that terrible typhoon haiyan. and i think the framework likely would be very helpful in the planning phases and would have been very helpful in the planning phases as we both set forward our forces to then there. to help there. i think when you get on to the political strategic level, it is just another area where canadians and americans seek to leverage each other in another arena. you will know that the american government signaled a bit of a shift towards the asia-pacific. canada is -- while remaining tremendously interested in our

nato alliance as well -- seeks to strengthen our various alliances and connections in the asia-pacific. so just recently, for instance, we placed a general officer on the staff of pacific command staff which is a first for us and allows us not only to work more closely with the americans in engaging the asia-pacific arena, but also provides us a little bit more awareness of those things that are strategically relevant as we go forward. >> in the united states, i'm sure you're very aware that we're in the midst of significant budget battles, dysfunction some might say even in polite society, one would call it dysfunction. and, for those of us who watch defense, we are particularly focused on the implications of that for u.s. defense strategy and planning. i'm wondering if, how you would describe the cuts in defense in

canada. i don't think you have quite the political environment we do right now, but surely you must have the same, um, sense of general interest in how canada plans to go forward and, again, strategically where canada wants to be in terms of its role in the world and how to underwrite that with military capability. i'd love to hear a little bit about the efforts underway in canada including your own defense reform initiative if i've got the title right that looks to cut inefficiencies to free up some funds. >> well, good for you, yes, you've got the name right. the defense renewal team has worked a year. one of the first tasks that i got from the prime minister upon taking on this profession was a direction to maintain everyone in the numbers that i have in the regular force and and the reserve forces, all of the capacities and capabilities that we've got right now, but find a billion dollars, that's about

5-7% of our entire budget to take out of the back rooms in these administrative processes to reinvest in the operational part of the forces. that was a very difficult task. in the past those with as many years in as i have will have seen that we've had ups and downs over the last 5 years, and usually in the down -- 35 years, and usually in the down period we decrease in size and/or capabilities. this was a very heart ping task given to me by the prime minister in one sense because those very difficult things were not the center of the task, and we think we've actually put our finger on 26 initiatives under seven headings that will allow us to find 700 million in a couple years and going on to a billion as required in five years and going ahead. but we, like all departments and western countries, i think, are

suffering from many of the same fiscal challenges that your country is, and we went through a strategic review several years ago and a deficit reduction action plan, all of which has decreased our budget by 10-15%. and and this has required all kinds of trade-offs along the way too. going forward and recently we just had the speech which indicates that the government is looking to refurbish their canada first defense strategy and in that way allows us to look at where we can invest in new areas. so there will be trade-offs to come certainly within a stable envelope of tight resources. >> okay. and then the last question i wanted to ask is on author rad. norad. and you mentioned in your comments that, expansion, if you will, into the maritime domain, i think there's a lot of interest, too, in cyber domain,

and you did reference the author rad strategic -- norad strategic review that's underway. can you give us some insights into what the u.s. and canada are exploring into that strategic review and what types of changes we might expect to see come out of that? >> i know that the commander of norad who is not only the u.s. commander of norad, but the canadian commander of norad, and that's general chuck jacoby together with his lieutenant general are going through a systematic review of the threats that norad expects to potentially face in coming decades and what kind of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance is required not only for the aerospace threat, but also offshores all the way to how do you harden the very core of norad capabilities from cyber threats. and as you pay well know -- as you may well know, much of

norad's current early warning system is based on a distant early warning set of radars that were put up in the 1950s and refurbished in the late 1980s. that's coming around again, and i know that one of the things that norad's looking very carefully at is how do you move that forward to provide more warning time, and does it need to be ground based, are there other ways to do that. and these are fundamental questions that speak to the unity between our two nations. >> okay. i'm going to turn it over looks like to stephanie who will relay some questions from the audience. >> [inaudible] from the audience, and the first line is almost always thank you so much for your candor and for being here and agreeing to talk to us. so thank you on behalf of the audience members. the way sam and i have divided these are sort of topically, and i am the lucky person who draws the short straw on the budget questions. so the first two questions are

very discreet, and they're about, um, one is about the, um, auditor general's report that was reported in the news earlier this week about the planned procurement strategy for ships. and given the auditor general's somewhat candid and scathing remarks on the inflexibility in budgeting, can you give us a little bit of your insight into how do you think about the longer term 30-year strategy for ship procurement when it comes to rising labor and material costs? the second specific question was about the close combat vehicle and the f-18 follow on. so those are sort of the more difficult kind of programmatic questions. and then the sticky question -- maybe not difficult, but a sticky question is looking forward in the next 10 to 15 to 20 years, you've talked a lot about today the importance of working together as a team, but in light of, as you mentioned,

the fiscal difficulties here this the u.s. and also in canada, how do you think about being a coalition partner, and what are you looking to the u.s. to provide as well as a coalition partner? thanks. >> well, thank you very much, and i think what i'll do is take the second one first and the series of first ones second. what we will seek from united states certainly at home is to be a great partner as the u.s. armed forces have been over, as i say, a hundred years in the security of the continent. but i think that like host other nations, we will be seeking good, strong, cogent leadership from americans internationally. it's unfair, certainly, how we all seek the american point of view, but what wonderful things

it says about the people of this nation, the leaders of this nation that so often that desire from coalition partners is met time and again. americans, i think, largely get maybe feeling some fatigue from having add that leadership position for so long -- having had that leadership position for so long, and yet it comes with having been a leader so greatly respected for so many years. on those, on those first questions the very heartening thing is that as we go forward with a rewrite of the canada first defense strategy, the government makes very clear to me that the commitment is there for the equipment that was listed in canada first defense strategy based on the right of 2008. so this includes a replacement for fighter aircraft, it includes a replacement of

several vehicle fleets for the army, it includes a series of ships including arctic offshore patrol ships, joint supply ships, joint support ships and a new combat surface combat plant. combatant. be i think what has surprised canadians, certainly auditors general recently and maybe even members of the military and the government ourselves over recent years is when we talk only about the price tag and then expand to take a rook at -- take a look at what it will cost to run the equipment. when you buy your ford cortina, you come up with one price, when you come up with everything for the 23 years that you'll run it, it's entirely a different price. the nice thing about that different price, that long price, the one that includes operation and management for many years, is we hold the

leverage lever on that so we can throttle forward or back as required to meet strategic and operational needs. the part, of course, i am most interested in as the chief of defense staff and the individual who will be providing options for our government to be not only in defense of canadian interests, but also as good coalition partners is how is the equipment there. so i very much am heartened by the fact that the government remains committed to these things, and i look very much forward to the delivery of the first of these vehicles. how many come, the numbers remain in our canada first defense strategy, and i have every hope that those numbers will remain the same. thank you. >> great, thank you. and i have a thurm of questions here -- a number of questions here on the arctic. so beginning with the framing that secretary hagel last week released the u.s. department of

defense arctic strategy in halifax along with the fact that canada currently leads the arctic council and will be followed by the u.s., some of the questions are about what the potential is for u.s.-canada cooperation to advance the north american b agenda when it comes to the arctic over the next several years. and under that there are actually a couple questions on capabilities. you had mentioned the investments that will be made in the offshore cutter in satellite capabilities for monitoring. what other capabilities does canada have in mind, and what capabilities does canada think the u.s. should contribute? somebody asked is the u.s. free riding off of canada when it comes to arctic defense issues. >> i'll answer that last bit right off the bat, no. the population in alaska far outnumbers the northern populations across all of the arctic in canada.

therefore, in fact, when we had a terrible accident, an aircraft landing short of alert in the early 1990s, in fact, it took us days by ground to get to that site, and we just arrived there as our friends from the united states air force arrived having started from alaska. but this does speak to it was a very interesting presentation that secretary of defense hagel gave at the halifax international security forum on the weekend in which he presented the framework for the united states going forward. and it spoke not only to the importance of the arctic, but also a concern towards environment and climate change. all of these things really are very heartening in that it confirms the fact that the united states is like minded with canada and, in fact, all

the eight arctic nations in seeing the arctic as free of military competition. that's a very important point because it frees the military chiefs of defense like myself to focus on providing military support to civil authorities. and all of those things appeal to all of our better angels. a couple of years ago i was the head of mission for the canadian delegation that came together with delegations from each of the arctic nations to discuss the arctic search and rescue treaty which did end up with a legally-binding treaty which really was a tremendous step forward in listing all of the capabilities, meager as they may be. i tell you, if you're thinking of being an adventurer in the far north, better wear a wet suit, or if you fall in, better be rared to survive for a -- prepared to survive for a few hours while we determine how

best to get to you. the fact is anything that happens in the north is going to require the efforts of one, two or several of the arctic nations up there. so these other issues like the military input to support with an environmental disaster, these are the kinds of things that we're working on, not the basing of troops up there with the idea of providing military might or capability for that, for that purpose. >> another question from the audience on your views on the u.s. use of lethal unmanned aerial systems, drones, by the united states in afghanistan and elsewhere. and the second part of that question, does canada have any plans to purchase this capability going forward? so views on the united states' use since 2002 when the first one was fielded and views on whether canada needs this capability.

>> um, i think it's fair to say that military leaders of any kind will have very few intrinsic concerns about the use of kinetic force in support of a valid operational campaign. so if a kinetic round is propelled towards an enemy, a confirmed enemy, for strategic purposes by a rifle, by an artillery piece, by an aircraft manned or by an aircraft unmanned, any of those that end up with a desired end state is a supportable point of view. to answer the first part -- sorry, i think the second part of the question, the canada first the defense strategy back in 2008 signaled that canada would be finally buying its own capability of unmanned aerial vehicles. it's yet to be determined whether ours will carry lethal

capabilities onboard or just simply be for electronic, optical and ir surveillance. but having said that, canada has been effectively using unmanned aerial vehicles themselves rented, leased through the afghanistan war and onboard our ships that are right now in the arabian gulf to great effect. so we're in the game along with many nato allies and delighted by the capabilities it gives us to use the high ground in reconnaissance and surveillance. >> with can i just -- can i just ask a question linking the last two questions. unarmed isr-capable unmanned systems would seem to be a great way forward in the arctic for maritime domain awareness. is there any effort underway to build any kind of architecture there that uses unmanned systems? >> that's a great question, isn't it? because even as we go back to one of our earlier points, that

instant early warning -- distant early warning radar line only really provides a warning short of the arctic archipelago. so the back few bedrooms of our house really are unalarmed by alarm system we've got in place right now. and the sense is that unmanned aerial vehicles could go into a spot which is really very difficult for human beings to operate in for a good portion of the year and provide a sat. the unfortunate thing about it, of course, is you quickly run into communication problems as soon as you get above be 60 degrees north, 65 degrees north, you can no longer see the satellites that are in geostationary orbit over the equator. therefore, what you need really when you talk about infrastructure is less about towers on the ground or buildings on the ground and more of a constellation of satellites that provide you the this communication link. and once you've got that link,

what's the insurance of these machines that allows you safely to bring -- send them out and bring them back. so there's also an interest in aero stats and the technology that could bring. for anyone who's been in the arctic, you know, we speak about that. and certainly, we're opening up a new set of beachfront properties up there at a much greater rate than we expected. but anybody who has been up in the arctic and actually worked or flown over the arctic will know for a good portion of the year it really is a terribly inhospitable place and a very, very difficult set of challenges whenever you want to operate anything up there. so it's of great interest to us, and i think likely we will find a mixture of manned aircraft and unmanned vehicles and tethered vehicles to provide us that capability. >> very good with. stephanie? >> sir, i have one question about the norad strategic review, if i could ask you to put your prior hat back on.

with norad in charge of air space, wanting control for 50 years and then adding an additional mission of maritime warning, can you talk about what the future may hold for norad and what kind of additional mission sets that from a canadian perspective you might like to see come on down the pike? >> well, that's very interesting, isn't it? because back in 1958 it truly only was aerospace defense. bombers, and we pretty much knew where they would come from if they were going to come, and it would be up over the north pole, so it was pretty much unidirectionally focused, and you knew what you needed to defend yourself. of course, i think it's probably our parents or our grandparents who were even trained this getting underneath their desks for that threat. and there were over a couple hundred thousand people who with daily wore a norad patch to work, you know? when people say that things have

gotten tougher and more complex in the strategic arena, i think they're right, it is more complex, but my goodness, we've certainly stepped back from a potential set of threats that was so apparent and existential at that time. today we count approximately 5-7,000 people, canadian and american, who wear a norad patch to work. there are others who support norad, but really that number has come down with a decrease of that existential threat. but we no longer look directly north. now we talk in terms of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and those won't specifically come over the north. they can come over the west, they can come over the northeast to hit downtown north america. so really that unidirectional look that we looked to defend against is now omni directional and inward ever since 9/11,

inward. so i think -- and a recognition that threats can approach from offshore as well. so in this linkage of the maritime warning -- not maritime defense, but maritime warning -- that came in in 2006 really did expand norad's warning duties. so the question naturally comes along now that you've got this very efficient and effective warning capability that goes directly into our most senior decision makers, what else could it be used for? could norad aid cyber command, for instance, in getting the message out to these senior decision makers when the time comes rather than have cyber command itself stand something like that up? are there other inputs that can be coalesced, brought together in kind of an all sense or integration center at norad to

provide these sorts of warnings. and i think what we'll find is the answer will be, yes. it'll be interesting to see just exactly which capabilities norad will be given to respond. right now truly it is only within the aerospace defense line that norad has any duty to respond. >> this is another arctic question. this is specifically asking do you see the arctic council as ever having a budget for acquisition of military hardware, ie, surveillance, reconnaissance or search and rescue capabilities? so should there be an operational role for the arctic council, and is that a possibility going forward, or will it just be bilaterally and multilaterally that there'll be arctic cooperation? >> that's a very interesting question. i have to, in full disclosure, say that, of course, canada's partnership in the arctic

council is led from the foreign affairs department, and anything that we do in support of the arctic council is done in support of efforts, what we call foreign affairs and international trade development. i think what i would say the what the military can do in support of the arctic council -- and maybe there's some implications that would shed some light on that question -- is exactly what we've done over the last couple of years. and as chiefs of defense be of the arctic nations, we group together at least once a year to discuss capabilities that are in support of our mutual civilian authorities. it's a wonderful pressure relief point between russia and the other seven arctic nations because, again, most of these things appeal to everyone's better angels.

so i don't think likely most of those things that the civilian authorities will require this terms of operations in the north will be supplied by the militaries of those eight nations. i think it's unlikely the arctic council itself will become an operational function. i think it will continue to look at the militaries. and so then the question comes to will the militaries band together to buy pieces of equipment. i think that's probably less likely as developing individual national capabilities and then throwing hem for certain -- them for certain operations into a bin as we would to support an arctic search and rescue operation. >> i have a question from the audience that talks about a little bit more border-focused than what you've been talking about in terms of interaction between the two militaries. and given that canada command has been merged into i think it's canadian joint operations

command -- >> that's right. [laughter] >> i would like to know the interaction between joint forces command and northern command and operations along the border, what springs immediately to mind is always conflict management. if something happens in vancouver, and there's a southerly-blowing wind, seattle's at risk. and the opposite is, obviously, true. so could you talk about border cooperation between the two militaries. >> right. you may be aware there's a combined defense plan that speaks almost directly to that. and i think the combining of our expeditionary command and our canada command and operational support command into what you just named the canadian joint operations center has been a really, has had a coalescing effect for discussions with northern command as well. whereas they would have to discuss with one portion of our operational commands, now the entire command is focused this a very coalescing way -- in a very

coalescing way. so i think we have to be very careful with the border, of course. we don't approach the border from disaster response purposes the way we do for aerospace defense purposes. i think some people would say that if norad were not stood up as a binational command as it is now back in 1958 for existential reasons, we likely would not have ceded to each other the sovereignty that goes along with it. but having done so and having add no robs, the ideas -- no problems, the idea of not having to get any authority to fly our jets south across the border to prosecute requirements for norad is a useful thing and exactly the same for american jets going north. so the no regarding disaster management and consequence management. we're very respectful to each other's borders, respectful to the requirement to ask permission to carry weapons in

the other's territory, but it's also quite an easy process because it's based on one of up broken instruction. trust. even though it's a bilateral relationship, i think we've seen it having great effect and be not only with gustav and various other disasters that have befallen our states and provinces, we've been a great help to each other. but also as you said during the olympics, notch nuclear, biological capability that was resident in the states just under canada was put on offer to the canadians as required, should it be with required during the olympics. it wasn't, but there was a perfect example of how our combined defense plan could support potential operations together. >> go ahead. >> this'll probably be the last question from the audience. the quadrennial defense review is going on at the pentagon now, and you're going to see chairman dempsey later today.

what advice might you offer him on an issue that you would like to see taken up in this qdr from an allied perspective? >> i hesitate because it's a very presumptuous thing that i would counsel -- >> assuming he asks. >> yes, let's assume he asks me. [laughter] general dempsey, as he deals with potential sequestration 2.0. i think i probably would fall back to that very thing i said a little bit earlier, and that is that i'm only one chief of defense representing one military amongst dozens of others who will look to the united states armed forces, the leadership of the united states armed forces for leadership and the problems that will face groups of us, all of us, alliances within alliances going forward.

and i think there really -- with the chairman himself, i think there is a sense of fatigue amongst those nations, that nation, yours, that so often needs to take on that role. so if the chairman asks for my advice, i'd say keep on doing those tremendous things that you do which is including capabilities of international leadership, and we have very much learned from our american brethren how best to do that. love to take on that role ourselves, but i can tell you that most of the nations of the world, although they look for canadian involvement in these things, they'll be seeking the u.s. leadership in years going forward as they have in the past. >> well, i can't let you go without talking about nato. i'm amazed that it hasn't come up yet. so let me just since it's the last question, i'll ask it very open-endedly, and you can take it where you like. you mentioned this your remarks

the importance, the continuing importance for the u.s. and canada of the transatlantic link. nato is approaching another summit, it is coming to a different phase of its operations in afghanistan. there have been smart defense suggestions, there have been framework partner suggestions. of what's your sense of where nato as an alliance needs to go to best capture and defend common interests? >> thank you. i think that when we look ahead and see a nato five years from now that supports the most likely of challenges and issues that will face us, we'll see one that has more interdependence and reliance. you speak about connected force initiatives and smart defense, that all speaks to training together smartly, lower costs, perhaps fewer ready forces and

yet forces ready within nations to join in as required operationally. when we talk about smart defense as canada and the united states, we talk about our european partners training with us other here in north america as well which hasn't been usually what we've seen with our training, canada and u.s. have either historically been with posted forward to europe or moving there for exercising. that's not absolutely necessary. there are nato nations that train regularly in the united states and others that train regularly this canada. we can coalesce for a connected force that allows us to be interwith dependent for training here -- interdependent for training here too. so i think you'll see us working smarter, more interdependently and using fewer dollars to -- [inaudible] that we've seen in use this recent years.

>> i'll let you off the stage with that. general lawson, thank you so much for spending time with us here today. i know you have a busy schedule. i also know this weather is extremely hilled from your perspective -- mild from your perspective, and i have no doubt you will have no trouble getting back to canada from the u.s. while all the u.s. airlines shut down. [laughter] so greatly appreciate your time here today and please join me in a round of applause. [applause] >> and later today here on c-span2 we'll be focusing on education with connecticut governor daniel malloy. he'll be with live at the american enterprise institute at 1:30 p.m. eastern time and then tonight, france's role in europe and the rest of the world and the french position on the iran nuclear agreement. we'll hear from the leader of the french opposition party. ..

this is hosted by the world affairs council of washington, d.c. they came together last week and heard from former deputy assistant secretary of state for iran, john limbert, and the founder and president of the national iranian national council.i's barbara slavin is the moderator. >> good meaning and welcome. thank you for braving the weather and the pre-pre-holidayt holiday traffic to join us tonight for what i'm sure will be a fascinating discussion. before we begin i'd like to takn

just a couple of minutes atg ae time to talk about some upcoming events about the world affairsut me upc councils the council year-end campaign, which begins next week. on december 4, the town so hosts dr. henry kissinger for a luncheon at the fairmont hotel. dr. kissinger's topic will be the a ship hit it -- asia pivot strategy. on december 4, the council's annual international .oliday affair we will be honoring the ambassador of rozelle and his diplomatic team at the 2014 global education gala in march -- the ambassador of brazil. this kicks off what will be an extended series of activities with brazil in the coming years.

the annual giving campaign gets going next week, and i invite you to consider supporting the international and affairs and global education program, especially our programs with high school teachers and students to bring a much-needed global education into our classrooms. there are many ways you can help . become a sponsor of our global education program, sponsor one teacher or one student or tend to attend one of our events, or the easiest of all, and i hope one that everyone here who shops online will consider, if you purchase items on amazon.com, please do so via our website. go to our homepage, click on the icon for amazon, and shop as usual. we will receive 3% of every purchase. it's seamless, anonymous, and it really helps, and it is no additional cost to you. i thank you for considering support of the world affairs council in these ways.

before adam gives us the signal that we are ready to begin, let me remind you that this rogue ram is being filmed for c-span and for later broadcast -- this program is being filmed for c- span and for later broadcast. please turn off your phone at this time. welcome to the world affairs council, washington, d.c.. i am president of the council, and on behalf of the board of directors and advisory committee, i welcome you here this evening to our foreign policy series discussion on the recently signed interim agreement between iran and the p5 plus germany and geneva. we have gathered a distinguished panel of experts who will walk us through what just happened and what may lie ahead. headlines during the last 48 hours have run the entire spectrum from victory for iran obamastoric mistake to achieves historic measure. most comments have followed what has become a redeemable

republican/democrat divide, but recent polls indicate that nearly 2/3 of all americans support an agreement with iran at would lift sanctions for iran in return for tehran restricting its nuclear program. what is undeniable is that there are many layers to this cake, and we look forward to hearing from our panelists as they discuss whether the agreement brings new hope for nuclear negotiations with iran or further disappointment. our panelists are no strangers to the world affairs council audiences. we welcome back all three. ambassador john bloomberg is professor at the united -- professor of international affairs at the united states naval academy -- ambassador john limbert. tehran at the u.s. embassy where he was held captive during the iran hostage crisis.

his last postings at state were as dean of the forest institute language studies. parsi is the founder and president of the national iranian american council and author of two books, "treacherous alliance," which won the silver medallion from the n foreman mutations, and "a single roll of the dice," which was selected by foreign affairs as the best book of 2012 on the .iddle east our moderator is a washington correspondent and a senior fellow at the atlantic council, where she focuses on iran. she is a regular commentator on u.s. foreign policy and iran. she is the author of the 2007 book "bitter friends, bosom enemies." ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming our panel.

[applause] thank you very much. thank you for coming out on a cold and nasty night, but i think the news of this past weekend is sufficient enough to pique everyone's interest. i guess you will have to do another book called "another roll of the dice" or "several roles of the dice." last marcha report that made a number of recommendations, and i'm very pleased to say it appears that people were listening. if you go back and look at that report, you will see that the agreement that was reached and some of the other measures that were part of this agreement were all recommendations of the atlantic council task force. enough of a commercial for our efforts. i promised i would play devil's advocate a little bit because, as you will see, i think we generally agree that this is a

positive development. let me briefly sketch some of the main elements of the deal. iran stops producing uranium .hat is enriched to 20% this is very close to weapons grade. iran will stop it and take the stockpile and has an turn it into a form that cannot easily be made into weapons. ins puts time on the clock terms of whether iran could break out and make a nuclear weapon. iran also will stop most of its work at a place called arak, which is a heavy water reactor. if completed, it could yield plutonium in its spent fuel, and iran has basically agreed to pause on this as well for six months. iranians are not going to add any new centrifuges to the 10,000 that are spinning away. they are going to give the international atomic energy agency daily access to their enrichment facilities.

right now, the iaea gets to go about once a week. i understand there will also be remote monitoring cameras installed. at least according to one account. more transparency and limits on the program and turning the stock piles into less dangerous forms. the iranians will continue to enrich uranium to five percent -- 5%. they say they will not increase their stockpile. they will take their excess and turn it into again at how to form, a form that cannot be readily turned into weapons, but they will still have a stop asle, which could give them half dozen nuclear bombs -- but they will still have a stockpile . putting on my hat is the devil's advocate here, this agreement does not force iran to dismantle a single centrifuge or enrichment plant -- i'm sorry, you cannot hear? do you hear me now?

[inaudible] >> i'm sorry. can you hear me now? >> can you hear me now? okay. everybody else seems to be able to hear me. i thought i was talking in a loud enough voice but let me continue. to play devil's advocate, this agreement does not oblige -- oblige the iran to dismantle a single centrifuge or take part in of their nuclear infrastructure. what it does is it posits the program and it prevents iran from continuing to advance toward the point where it can make nuclear weapons. during this six-month period, the united states and the rest of the -- and germany are supposed to negotiate an agreement with iran. that will be more long lasting although how long lasting is something that is not clear. so my general take from this is that this is an excellent first step. i think the reason why i'm pleased about it is because it

resulted from the most intensive one on one negotiations between the united states and iran that we have seen since the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when we did have such talks. those of you who have read my book know that we did have direct talks with the iranians after 9/11 for about a year and a half. however, the report talks this time. they were at a higher level between our deputy secretary of state l. burns and others from the iranian government, and the result is certainly a story. we have not seen an agreement like this ever between the united states and the islamic republic of iran. if it works, it means that we may see progress on other issues in the middle east where iran has taken a different site from the united states, and we may begin to see some real progress on bilateral relations between the u.s. and iran. if it fails though it will be an

enormous disappointment and we will hear not only the u.s. congress calling for more sanctions, but we will get the israeli prime minister netanyahu talking again about military action against iran. so i think that's -- open all of you could give me. that's where we are now. i want to turn to our very excellent speakers. first, to trita parsi because treated was in geneva for this round -- for two rounds i think because, he really knows what the drama was like, and can set the scene of how this came about, was it because of the personalities of john kerry and the iranian foreign minister? was it because of the back channel work of bill burns? was a because of wendy sherman and baroness ashton? you tell us. >> thank you, barbara. a great, great pleasure being here at the world affairs council. top secret pleasure great

pleasure to be with my good friends, barbara and john, who i owe both quite a lot to it comes to understanding this issue. and he didn't play much of a devil's advocate i think. you were quite positive about this deal. and rightly so in my view. it was interesting in geneva and i think the last day was quite tough. long moments where large number of journalists were sitting in the lobby of the intercontinental hotel in geneva were as the negotiators were on some of the upper floors. they were starting to get a sense that there's been actually not work out. in the beginning i think the vast majority were quite optimistic for a very simple reason, the cost of failure is so great for both sides. there is a symmetric situation in the sense that neither side can feel particularly comfortable walking away thinking, even if there's no deal we are in a pretty good situation. iranians will not be a good

situation. perhaps more importantly, from the perspective that immediate decision-makers because of the difficulty for the rouhani government to retain the current position that they have, if they cannot deliver on negotiations. they have presented themselves, and i think rightly so, to be dramatically different from the ahmadinejad crowd. and to be able to handle diplomacy in a sophisticated way but they need to be two to tango and if they can't we be able to get some of sanctions released they are looking for which means the economy would suffer and at some point within the next year, year and a half much of the population support for the present would be lost. ultimately, i think we know that very well over here, once the population grows disillusioned from the idea of the hopes that the president put forward, the support amongst the population

tends to erode. this would definitely happen to the iranians at some point, the rouhani can come if they couldn't get a deal. and from the president perspective, if there is not ideal, if they actually finally make a real effort, determined effort at diplomacy and still they couldn't get to it, then the arguments that diplomacy had been exhausted would for the first time actually carries some degree of truth in it. that would create a scenario in which the voices in favor of military action would quadruple. the president just had a very bad experience trying to push for a war and he got quite a lot of pushback from the population. so this would certainly not be a row to would like to go down again, but more importantly this is not a winnable war. this is a president the kind of got a nobel peace prize on credit. and now he's looking for an opportunity to create a legacy. clearly on the domestic issues

he needs it but it's going to be extremely difficult. if you are now looking around in the middle east and asking herself, which one issue could i potentially get some success on in the next year, two years and a half before have to leave office, so that leasing some sort of legacy, something positive, paradoxically iran is now the lowest hanging fruit in the middle east. three is a disaster israel-palestine is always not looking particularly good. egypt is lost. yemen is just waiting to explode. suddenly iran has a process that makes it attractive and that is one of the major factors as to why the president, once you only got elected and he felt there was a series, sophisticated committed partner on the other side, that the president now has committed political will in his

own name towards this process in which is not done at all since he took office. and that combined with the iranians are doing the same is creating a dramatically different situation into negotiations than ever has existed. but still he didn't mean it was easy and it didn't mean it couldn't have collapsed. the talks were supposed to end friday, but they continued on through saturday and that's when john kerry should have been to all of the other foreign ministers showed up and that a lot of us were thinking, they are only showing up because ideal already is had and they just had to wait for them to show up so the photo op could be there without any one of the missing. then it just kept dragging on. then they became 10 p.m. at night government and the talk was that john kerry has to go to london the day after. curiously because he needed have been meeting with with the british foreign minister in london on the day after, or as the british foreign minister was saying at the same hotel. didn't make sense to fly to london to meet with him. and as time went on, people

start to think, well, they shall have to walk home without a deal. how is that going to be for john kerry? twice now he is showing up, committed himself, put his name on the line to get a nuclear deal, and twice he would have to walk home empty handed. already now we have a deal we're in munich, surrendered. imagine what would happen if he didn't get a deal. if he didn't have anything to show for us, all of these diplomatic efforts. towards the end it was quite dramatic and a lot of people thought that perhaps it wouldn't happen. then we saw one iranian journalist run down the stairs towards her laptop. everyone rushes over d.c. okay, that person must have known something because she was coming from upstairs and that's within the dishes are. the diplomats tended to talk much more with their journalists and the american diplomats. the american diplomats were very, very disciplined, hardly said a word.

everyone thought, okay, something is happening. we rushed over and she says there is a deal. it's been, and they're just working out some logistics. it starts to spread, but there's no confirmation. the only person who knows about it is one iranian journalist. and the iranian immediate doesn't have the dictation of putting out information that has been confirmed three times before you publish it. there was a lot of confusion taking place, after about another hour a lot of people thought there is no deal. but sure enough it was confirmed later on that there was a deal, what she was saying was not incorrect. the delay was partly because they were debating how and where and when will they have a signing ceremony. and it ended up being a signing ceremony without an audience. they had the media center 10 minutes away and that's what people expected it to be but instead they decided to have it

at the -- so negotiate a lack of media and don't like them too much. this was all done without journalist in the room. then they later on came in after 23 hours of negotiations on the last day. john kerry who i assume is -- gave about a 40 minute presentation as crisp as it could be. you could never have expected that he'd been awake and negotiated for 23 hours before giving that press conference. we were exhausted but we were mostly staying with twitter for 20 hours. these guys were actually negotiating. they came in there and the presentation was made. and if i get sick a couple of, a couple minutes is a couple of things about, i'm saying this because i think the white house has not been given a fair treatment in the media, references to munich and surrender is frankly absurd. the iranians gave the vast majority of concessions in this

round. it doesn't mean they lost and people in iran are sobering. but in this round they gave more than the u.s. they did so because of the investment, in the second round they will get that message was more but it will balance out. it's in the second round where the main leverages of both sides will be traded. that is from the american side at this point, banking sanctions and oil sanctions. and from the iranian side it would be to agree to the additional protocol and to the full scale inspections access to the various, to the iaea. whereas, and barbara and i disagree on this believing that sanctions it wants -- is what got this done. i think if the sanctions nippled this situation come about from the american perspective and i think it is understandable if one looks at it, it may leave that impression. one can also say from the iranian side that its 19,000

centrifuge that got the americans to the table. the bush administration refused to come to the table. when the iranians, this team in 2005 offered to cap enrichment and no more than 3000 centrifuges, we said no, because we are committed to idea that there should be zero in richmond at the time. and lo and behold, eight years later they have 19,000 centrifuges. both sides in my view have built on a lot of added leverage that they are not trading away. i'm not so sure that either side actually managed to outpace the other when it comes to the. if anything i think in the last eight years both sides have exhausted their pipe dreams. the iranian pipedream that they could just present to the west with an unfettered in the program without any restrictions, complete recognition of the rights, was a pipe dream, wasn't going to happen and it's not happen. the western pipe dream that you could push back the iranians and

have them surrender and give up their nuclear program in totality, have not a single spinning centrifuge was also pipe dream. we lost eight years chasing a pipe dream and now both sides have exhausted it and there's no cards left to play. i wouldn't risk more. as a result they are doing what actually makes diplomacy happen to and what is the? you compromise. the reason there is a deal because both sides have accepted each other's bottom line. the west except that the iranians will keep enrichment, but it's going to be limited, below 5% and this is enabling their range just a the right for enrichment will be respected. at the same time it rains have accepted the americans bottom line and that is, iran will not have a nuclear weapon. and the path towards nuclear weapon has been closed because with the inspections and the other limitations, the iranians will no longer have an

undetectable breakout capability. if they tried to cheat, we will know very soon and will have plenty of time to do something about it. the two bottom lines have now converged. they both have accepted it and that's part of the reason why there is a breakthrough but i have to say, it's not a done deal. because the main leverages have not been exchanged it. heahere i visited the challengey perhaps be more on the side of the americas. it's not in the hands of the president. if it was i have no doubt he would be able to deliver on it. but the main leverage points that iranians want is for them to give up their cards a sanctions that have to go through congress. the president can use waivers, but i have doubts as to whether they can be a final, complete, permanent solution that ends this issue is the sanctions are still on the books but every six months this, this, the next, and

every future president honors the deal by continuing to use his waivers. it may work. i don't know but i have a doubt. i definitely doubt the iranians would go along with that because just waiting sanctions is an inherently reversible measure, and the principle that has been established for the negotiation is both sides will exchange reversible concessions for reversible concessions, and a reversible concessions for a reversible concessions are we wanting to give a reversible concessions that requires us to offer them a reversible concessions. in the next couple of months that will be fought out between white house and the congress. thank you spent a great place to start because i think underlying all of this is the whole bitter history of the u.s. and iran. no one there to talk about that then john limbert is expressed in many different ways. john, did this agreement, you know, it's eventually going to make a difference between the u.s. and iran?

as our iranian friends like to say, there are only two possibilities. it either will or it won't. so there we are. it's actually quite simple. at bottom. thank you, cheetah and barbara -- trita and barbara. both have been speaking and writing very sensibly about iran for many years. i mean, this is as you know, in this done this is a very passionate subject. i tell my students at the naval academy that one could spend his life going to iran events in washington, whether it's the wilson center, the world affairs council, the foundation for the defense of democracy. every ideological point of, every, everyone. you would never run out of subjects to talk about.

it's an issue i think at the end of the day it's an issue that a small number of people who care about passionately. and probably a small number, probably 30% of their groupies here in this room tonight. what i'm going to talk, i'm going to put the question of so what, and now what? in other words, are we and the iranians finally getting off of the road to nowhere, a road that we've been on, stuck on for 30 years? remember in june in 2009, president obama offered the iranians a new beginning based on mutual respects, based on mutual interests, and that laid

behind the grievances of the past. that approach, unfortunately, caught the iranians off guard you.because what he had done wao discredit decades of anti-american rhetoric, a staple of the diet to tehran. how does one thing as an enemy someone who sins you creating, who quotes the poet, and he speaks of mutual respect? something that the iranians have always said they wanted. the response to the president's outreach and offer was to say the least disappointing. it was as though the iranians saw him not as an enemy, but as something more dangerous, as a

rival. the word they used was -- now, as our iranian friends know it means co-wife. [laughter] something more dangerous, more attractive and younger. and, therefore, something you fear more than the enemy. now, it's been five years since that original outreach. and, finally, these efforts, it looks like these efforts are getting a response. now, whatever the valley of the current nuclear deal, whether you denounce it or whether you support it, you cannot deny that today we are in a very different place with iran then we have

been for the last 34 years. just look at what we have. hassan is talking to hussein. think about that. the two foreign ministers are having professional and productive discussions. remember that, i remember this, some of you may remember, the last time before september of 1979 -- sorry, up 2013 that the two foreign ministers met was in october of 1979. and these meetings between then secretary state fans and foreign minister were disasters. cyprus fans, ever the cool polished diplomat -- cyrus vance, completely exasperated. so what should we do?

i think before we jump in and say this is a great deal, or this is a terrible deal, we should step back, take a few steps back and take a deep breath and admit that we and the iranians are now talking to each other, interacting in a way that five months ago was unthinkable. just could not imagine it. why is this so? what's changed? well, some will credit the sanctions was pushing the iranians decide to change their approach. it may be true. but i'm cautious here. i think any case of the sanctions, or the question is why, you need to make a distinction between what you know to be true and what you wish to be true.

and i think there are people who wish the sanctions have done this and, therefore, they say the sanctions did it. what we know to be true is that the iranian economy is in bad shape. the iranian -- iran with its resources, with its educated population, with its geography, it should be economically it should be a paradise. it is clearly not. it is not a paradise. let me in as i like to do with something from the great -- he said something, and it was echoed in a beautiful poem by robert frost called past year. 800 years ago he said, he said out beyond ideas of wrongdoing and right doing, there is a field. i will meet you there. it looks like we may at last be

meeting in a field beyond the ideas of centrifuges and subterfuges. we are not there yet, but there is at least, there are possibilities that just a few months ago, no one could have imagined. thank you. [applause] >> thank you, gentlemen. i will play devil's advocate. you accuse me of being too hot there, trita, so let me take the view of those who say -- as being too positive. we are being cheated, that the iranians will not keep the part of the bargain and sanctions will unravel and we will lose all the leverage that we've developed. you said that the iranians gave more than the americans did in this round. i'm not so sure.

the sanctions relief that he was is giving a small. it's worth a few billion dollars. but symbolically when you look at the fact that the entire international community had coalesced around the sanctions, we reached the maximum point of leverage, now the sanctions are going to begin to be eased. the question that a lot of critics raise is, once you start down that path, will you ever be up to get the sanctions back up to the point that they are at now? and had we given more than the iranians? >> thank you. that's one of the critiques of this deal. a couple of points on the. the first point is, the assumption then is that if we don't do a deal, the sanctions would still be there and they would continue to hurt the iranians. that i think is a very questionable assumption for a very simple reason. john i think put it brilliantly

what obama did when he came in the power. he was these extremely different american president at the iranians just could not wrap their heads around. because he was quoting the persian poets and speaking well, and his middle name was hussein. and as a result of that and the fact that the president then really tried with diplomacy wands, it failed, but a narrative that god created, largely true, perhaps partly exaggerated, was that it fell through because of the iranians. as a result the president could go very efficiently and tell the rest of the world to agree to sanctions, that they never had agreed to before. at the bush administration didn't even dare to dream about because the bush administration has no legitimacy on the international scene at that time. they could agree to because there was a sense that the united states actually tried. the united states was the good guy.

rouhani is nothing the taxing trek on the united states. he is tweeting rosh hashanah, greetings to the jewish people. his foreign minister is extremist sophisticated and charming. they are putting forward proposals that are clearly constructed and flexible. they are serious about diplomacy. in the last rounds of negotiation, about the day was spent on just deciding when and where will the next meeting be. the iranians made suggestions such as kabul, because clearly kabul is a safe place to negotiate. [laughter] and they were playing games like this about everything. everything was a negotiation. now it takes about five minutes to decide this. the venue is already sent. it will always be geneva. the only thing is that they combine their schedule. so now there is no excuse. the iranians are really trying, that is the impression on the international scene.

that has translated into a lot of countries who have agreed to these sanctions and have agreed to them very grudgingly because ultimately they don't like to be in the bad economic situation, and on top of that imposed sanctions which causes them to lose even more jobs and hurt their economy even further. those are not small country. they are now putting pressure on the united states saying this chance we're not going to miss because we will not continue to do economic -- for an idea of actually the time has come for it but because of your congress, you are just not willing to be a player because congress is playing politics. if it fails now it's not going to be particularly difficult but if it fails particularly at the u.s. is saying they refused to lift sanctions. it would be very easy for the reins to shift blame away from themselves onto the united states, and at that point the iranians can get far more sanctions released and there truly getting. not all of the sanctions could

will be able to be lifted up and maybe up to say i don't know, 20% of the sanctions would drift away, with one big difference. 20% of the sanctions would go away without the iranians giving a single concession. single access to arak. single camera for the iaea. many of the sanctions would fall apart. why? because the u.s. could not take yes for an answer. that's the risk of overplaying our hands. in fact, again going back to history when the iranians offer to stop the program at 3000 centrifuges and to date have 19,000, we need to be honest with ourselves and realize that the cost of us overplayed our hand in the past is that they now have 19,000 centrifuges. want to do that again? to leverage the obama administration has managed to put in place to balance out will also be lost without the iranians getting any concessions. >> john, do you want to jump

into this? >> very briefly. i find many of these critiques, not yours of course, barbara, but many of these critiques about is protectable as a clarence thomas supreme court decision. mac when you know what -- [laughter] you and i could write these things. in terms of, the assumption line behind them, is often, well, you can't trust them. look at -- they will cheat. they will cheat. well, i would say only this. that if we and the iranians could never agree on anything, then what about what we agreed on in afghanistan? in 2001, 2002, with the same team, with the same team. are what we agreed on back in

1991, again with largely the same, about the lebanon hostages? or something that affects me personally. if we and the iranians could never agree on anything at all, then i and 51 of my colleagues would still be in tehran. spin i'm going to ask one question that i'm going to opened it up to you. and that is about israel. and netanyahu. i have a theory going to try on both of you. tell me if you think it's crazy or not. netanyahu has been consistently negative about these negotiations, and he has decried the proposal before it was finished. he said it was a historic mistake after as nancy said it was a historic mistake but is it possible that you simply playing his assigned role in this? and its actual helpful for him to be so negative? for a couple of reasons.

one, it makes it easier for the iranians to defend the agreement. if netanyahu were jumping up and down for joy it would make it very difficult for hassan rouhani to say he got a good deal. and because it maintains pressure on the united states and the rest of the negotiators to get more concessions out of iran in the final deal. is it possible that netanyahu is on playing this because of those two reasons? and then it's helpful in a way. >> i like your theory. i don't know -- i have no idea if it's true or not, but it's true that by opposing the deal the way he is, he's certainly helping rouhani and others deal with some of their more difficult constituencies. i don't think he's doing this on purpose. i somehow doubt it. my own sense is that netanyahu

really still in his heart, in mrs. ahmadinejad. [laughter] -- he mrs. ahmadinejad. he was the gift that kept on giving as far as israel. that's right. but at the end of the day, what's interesting about it is that there are a lot of parents in israel, at least from what i understand from so my israeli friends, that are questioning his approach and saying you are not serving the interests of israel by isolating it, by getting into a public spat, public disagreement with the united states. states. >> tragicomedy of all the israeli debate a lot.

is it useful he remains so negative? will that put pressure on the united states to try to get more concessions out of the iranians? or is he isolating himself? will he be less relevant as these negotiations go on? >> i think he has become a less potent and i think that is been very problematic for israel. i wrote in my book, the last of my book, deserve issues interest because it has legitimate concerns about this issue. it would be more helpful to be helpful towards the process and ensure that you can be part of the process, and influences from inside an impact on the agenda. instead of taking this extremely extremely negative public position against, and as a result having been frankly excluded. a lot that indicates that the israelis did not know about the secret channel. and at a minimum even if they had hands about it, they did not

know the content of the conversation. if any about it, it's difficult to understand why they were spreading data that was completely false such as saying the u.s. had offered iran is to keep the -- $50 billion. that was not true. i think they didn't know, and i think it's high risk they frankly have not about the channel title. the former head characterizes this as essentially agreeing with what i wrote in my book in saying israel is playing -- paying the price down for having adopted the position of netanyahu and having been so negative to this process. that the u.s. thought they could not include israel. could not inform. so i don't think this is helpful for is a. i don't think this is got more concessions. i don't think it is helpful for the administration to have netanyahu come out and say this is a historically, a historic

mistake. this is only raising the political cost of the administration back home and have to deal with congress commits it. if anything it has probably cost the administration more than it is cost the iranians. on three key issues over the course of the last couple of years, israel and the u.s. is interest in the region have started to clearly diverge. doesn't mean they won't be strong allies of anything like that, but on the issue of iran, on the issue official palestine and on the central issue what is happening in the arab world, with the arab spring and the uprisings, et cetera, the israeli and the american perspective have diverge. that goes to the larger issue that the american-led order in the region essential to fall apart once the u.s. invaded iraq and he became so costly that it weakened the united states. and the u.s. is now trying to adjust to a new reality. the new reality means that there will be rising populations in many different arab world, and

the u.s. is no longer going to guarantee the survival of many of these autocrats. the united states at the last possible moment shifted and sided with the protesters in tahrir square, instead of backing mubarak. later on when there was essentially a coup in egypt the u.s. was not in favor of the muslim brotherhood at the same time not in favor of seeing egypt to go back to being a military dictatorship. where's the free perspective has been quite different. they were very upset with the u.s. not standing by mubarak. so this is greater a lot of tension, and that's just in addition to the fact that the personal chemistry between the president and the prime minister doesn't seem to be the best, as was between sector a state or the prime minister. the idea this is some sort of coordinated extremely well executed theater that is genius leak designed to add a little more pressure on the iranian negotiation, i'm not seeing any evidence for it.

i don't see them being able to pull it off that way spent it was a good theory. we are going to go to questions now. we have a microphone. we're going to pass it -- and if you could stick your name, and please ask a question. do not give a speech. asked a legitimate question and say to whom it is directed, if you would. >> pause for a moment while the second camera gets in place. >> stanley will be the first one. it is interesting, it is helping the iranians i think. >> we're talking about the region that has a history of self-destructive behavior. >> certainly true. >> and what appears to be infinitely subtle and clever is

actually just incredibly stupid. [laughter] >> i think there maybe some people in the audience who would take exception to that. john, are we ready? question, please. >> stanley. we have heard about these bilateral talks. sorry, i can't stand and hold this. i was looking at a story, the islamic republic news agency, the official news agency of iran november 24 denying that there were any bilateral talks. iran dismissed speculation by "the associated press" about bilateral talks with the united states. foreign minister official rejected the ap report. why would the foreign ministry reject this report? is there some into dissension going on in -- and in that

respect, what about khamenei? we have a mention in the his letter seemed very bland, letter of endorsement in response to rouhani. he hasn't publicly really embraced this? >> i would disagree but he has embraced the deal and rouhani gave a very happy speech today which he counts as a 100 day of his presidency. he counts from the day when his cabinet -- i would disagree. i was a supreme leader has given a lot of support. in terms of wh why iran would be divesting secret talks, you know, maybe john, you are best placed to talk about this. the iranians still have a kind of allergy to what admitting that what you're doing what they're doing, which is negotiating face-to-face with the americans. >> that's right. i, for one, and shot to learn that there is deception going on in the islamic republic news

agency. [laughter] i mean, that's just terrible. >> i think it's a very good question, and political peculiarities over there in which they are doing this. they're celebrating the outcome and denying the process. is peculiar is on the american side in which we got a deal but we just cannot help ourselves of accusing ourselves of surrendering your reality, unfortunate and not helpful but they will not change overnight. >> there's another factor, which is if they admit they were talks in iranians want to know who was conducting those talks. and that could put whoever it was, whether zarif are some of the novitiate and rather awkward position to have to go in front of parliament, they would be asked, what did you tell the americans, what did you promise. >> there was an interesting comment, an anthropologist may be very interesting comment this

morning i think on npr. he talked about the duality's within iranian political culture, the ability to believe two contradictory things at the same time. for example, the fact that twitter and facebook are banned and blocked while the leaders, the president, the supreme leader, the foreign minister all have their own facebook pages and twitter account. they are addicted to them. so the fact that the negotiations are happening while they are not happening shouldn't be i think very surprising spent one other factor, and that is that the people who lost the election are not happy at all. and so they are looking for ways to snipe, to bring down the government to show that this is not such a big deal. you know, and they are still there. they are temporarily contained a

they are still very much there, and it's something better think we have to be aware of your they have their hardliners just as we have ours, and there could be people who will jeopardize disagreements early over the next six months. we will see who is more disciplined and which administration is able to keep its opponents of the deal in check better. >> my name is steven. is netanyahu playing into what may be his real political base, not in the knesset but in our own house of representatives? >> that's to you, trita. spent i don't know if that's his political base but the idea that he is playing to his political base is true because i think after a decade in half if not more of having used the language

and attacking in the interim conversations in israel, and really playing up the rent as an existential threat, which a lot of people initial in the elite do not agree with. has never used the word iran is an existential threat, and actually completely dismisses a notion a country like israel that is so strong, that is 200 the weapons although he doesn't admit that, could be faced with an existential threats like iran. he doesn't use that language nor does he and many others. erin miller told me the other day on the radio that rabin whenever invoked the holocaust over and over again the way that netanyahu is. this is going from different directions of israeli politics. but after having done that and, to personify the idea that 1938 that iran is germany and ahmadinejad or rouhani is hitler in sheep's clothing. he cannot so they turn around and say, hey, that was a great deal. at a minimum he will have to

oppose it until the very last moment. and even afterwards still say i oppose it and they did everything i could. otherwise his political constituency was a you told us this isn't accidental threat. why did you not oppose it until the last possible second? i think a lot of domestic politics is pushing him, and again i think that is highly unhelpful for israel. in a quickly shifting strategic environment, you need leaders that have the ability to shift and adjust to the new strategic reality. and netanyahu has locked himself in a way that may play well politically but will not play well when it comes to the geopolitical situation. >> let me jump in and ask about the saudi. they were also vehemently opposed by now they put out statements that are more neutral. are the saudi adjusting to this or are they just quietly fuming? >> i don't know the answer to

that question, but i was going to make this point, that the saudis have made a statement which was much more moderate and much more, much more measured. i'm sure they are not particularly happy about this. but on the other hand, for a lot of reasons, clearly they are not going to want to identify with what netanyahu is saying. it's serving does not look good in their domestic political agenda or in the arab world's political agenda for these two to be lining up together. >> i had one point. i'm not an expert on saudi arabia but i think it is quite clear that there's been some interesting perhaps contradicted a fear by the saudis. .. council seat.